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In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger. The
puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a
dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general
one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I
present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one
of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One of these features is Nonexistence:
the failure of sentences involving transitive verbs to entail the existence of their direct
objects. The experiments reveal that with respect to all three of these features, “see”
behaves much more like a paradigmatically extensional verb than an intensional one.
But surprisingly, unlike “see”, “perceive” behaves much more like a paradigmatically
intensional verb. This shows that the category of perceptual verbs is not uniform with
respect to the features of intensionality; while Macbeth does not see a dagger, he may
still perceive one.
1. Introduction
In the philosophy of perception, there is a debate going back to the beginning of
the 20th century over whether we can perceive things that do not exist. The first
person to address the question explicitly was G.E. Moore [1905], who argued
that, at least in one sense of the word “perceive”, we can perceive things that
do not exist. Moore [1952] later went on to pose the question as one concerning
Macbeth: in having his fatal vision of a dagger, does Macbeth see a dagger?
While this question is vivid, it is also vexed. After more than a century
of debate, philosophers of perception are still largely divided over its answer.
On the one hand, many philosophers of perception hold that we can see things
that do not exist, and that Macbeth does in fact see a dagger, even while he
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is hallucinating.1 But many other authors hold the contrary view, according
to which seeing is a relation between a perceiver and a concrete object. Such
relations entail the existence of their relata, and so seeing a dagger entails the
existence of a dagger. Since there is no dagger for Macbeth to see, these theorists
conclude that Macbeth does not see a dagger.2 Given the scale and persistence of
the disagreement over its answer, the question of what Macbeth sees in having
his vision has acquired the status of a puzzle: the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger.
Insofar as we phrase the questions above with natural language perceptual
verbs, the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger is first and foremost a puzzle concerning
the semantics of our natural language perceptual vocabulary. Stated generally,
the puzzle concerns whether natural language perceptual verbs—for instance,
“see”, “hear”, “smell”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “sense”, among others—when
used transitively, entail the existence of their direct-objects.3 ,4 Stated more specif-
ically, the puzzle asks this question about “see” in particular. The failure of a
transitive verb to entail the existence of its direct-object—a feature that we can
call Nonexistence—is one of three traditional criteria for determining whether
a transitive verb is intensional. The other two criteria are the availability of a non-
specific reading for the direct-object noun phrase (Nonspecificity), and the in-
ability to substitute extensionally equivalent direct-object NPs without a change
in truth-value (Opacity).5 In what follows, I will treat the puzzle of Macbeth’s
1Among the defenders of the view that we can perceive things that do not exist, whether
by sight or otherwise, are Moore [1905, 1952], Ayer [1940, 1956], Smythies [1956], Anscombe
[1965], Hintikka [1969], Lewis [1983], Harman [1990], Chomsky [1995], Brogaard [2014, 2015],
Bourget [2017a,b].
2Defenders of this view include Austin [1962], Dretske [1969], Cartwright [1957], Soames
[2003], and Jackson [1977]. Additionally, relationalists in the philosophy of perception, such
as Brewer [2011], Campbell [2002], Fish [2009], and Logue [2012] often claim that their view
can claim semantic orthodoxy, and so seem to endorse the view that direct-object perceptual
reports are fully extensional.
3In what follows, I will use “direct-obect” as a term for the object answering to the NP in
the direct-object position of a perceptual ascription. Thus, I take a direct-object noun phrase to
be a piece of language, while the direct object is, potentially, an object, if it exists.
4Perceptual can also be used intransitively, but when they are, they are typically taken to
report epistemic notions. See Chisholm [1956] for the original account of the different uses of
perceptual verbs, and Johnston [2014] for a detailed account of why the intransitive uses of
such verbs are not perceptual. Of course, representationalists in the philosophy of perception
often define technical terms for the perceptual propositional attitude, but they acknowledge
that these expressions are not present in natural language or folk perceptual psychology.
5Anscombe [1965] was the first person to generalize the question of Macbeth’s dagger into
a question concerning intensionality generally: are our perceptual verbs intensional transitive
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dagger as a special case of the more general question of whether our perceptual
verbs are intensional, and I will answer this more general question for a subset
of the perceptual verbs listed above.
On the face of it, whether our perceptual verbs are intensional seems like an
empirical question: it is a question concerning the meanings of these verbs in
ordinary language. Yet in spite of the problem’s empirical character, no system-
atic empirical methods have been employed in an attempt at a resolution.6 This
paper makes use of empirical methods to evaluate a range of perceptual verbs for
the features of intensionality. I first present three studies that tested perceptual
verbs for Nonexistence. The first two of these studies compared three percep-
tual verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense”, to a paradigmatically intensional verb,
“search for”, and a paradigmatic extensional verb, “touch”. The third study then
tested a wider range of perceptual verbs—including “hear”, “smell”, and “feel”—
for Nonexistence. I then present two studies that tested perceptual verbs for
Nonspecificity, and two that tested them for Opacity. In each case, the first of
the studies tested “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for the feature, while second
tested the wider range of perceptual verbs for that property.
Since the results of these studies were given on a scale of intensionality as-
sociated with each property, the results fit somewhat uneasily into the standard
framework for understanding intensionality, on which the features of intension-
ality are either wholly present or wholly absent. However, there were clear pat-
terns that emerged across the studies. In each case, “see” received ratings that
were, on average, much closer to fully extensional than those for “perceive”, and
in general, “see” was in a cluster of verbs whose ratings were close to paradig-
matically extensional. By contrast, average ratings for “perceive” were much
closer to paradigmatically intensional, and in three experiments, “perceive” did
not differ statistically from “search for”. Thus, while speakers most often judge
that we cannot see what does not exist, they much more readily judge that we
can perceive things that do not exist. Thus, the results appear to show that while
Macbeth does not see a dagger, he may still perceive one. But beyond this solu-
verbs? She answered the question in the affirmative.
6For the most part, contributors to the debate have relied on informally evoking readers’
intuitions concerning example sentences, and generalizing from these examples to the entire
category of perceptual verbs. For two notable examples, see Anscombe [1965] and Bourget
[2017a], although there are many others.
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tion to the puzzle, these results also explain why the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger
has been so recalcitrant: the category of perceptual verbs is not uniform with
respect to the features of intensionality—“perceives” is intensional while “see”
is extensional—but neither is perfectly so.
2. Formulating the Puzzle
2.1. Macbeth’s Dagger
Consider the scene from Shakespeare’s famous play in which Macbeth, feverish
with prospective guilt, hallucinates a dagger, and asks himself, in the grip of this
hallucination, “Is this a dagger which I see before me // The handle toward my
hand?” The question seems to admit of only two answers: yes or no. Roughly
speaking, choosing one of these answers determines one’s view on the puzzle of
Macbeth’s dagger.
What reasons can we offer in favor of giving an affirmative answer to Mac-
beth’s question? First, it seems natural for us to describe Macbeth as seeing a dag-
ger. Macbeth is certainly having a visual experience of a distinctive kind—one
that can be distinguished from visual experiences of other things. For instance,
Macbeth is not having a visual experience of an artillery rifle. Given the need
for a word to describe Macbeth’s visual experience, it seems natural to think that
“see” can do the trick, and so to think that (1) says something true:
(1) Macbeth sees a dagger, not an artillery rifle.
If (1) can be true, then presumably (2) can be true:
(2) Macbeth sees a dagger.
If (2) is true, then “sees” does not entail the existence of what is seen. But since
we are presuming that there is no dagger, (3) must be false, at least insofar as it
entails the existence of a dagger:
(3) There is a dagger is such that Macbeth sees it.
Further, (2) entails (4):
(4) Macbeth sees something.
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But given that (2) is not existence-entailing, (4) cannot be equivalent to the ordi-
nary wide-scope quantification, as in (5):
(5) Some thing is such that Macbeth sees it.
Thus we seem to have a prima facie case that there is one reading of “sees” on
which Macbeth can see a dagger, and one on which he cannot. More generally,
this seems to show that there is a reading of perceptual ascriptions involving
“sees” on which we can see things that do not exist, and one on which we cannot.
Call someone who holds that there is a reading of our perceptual ascriptions that
is true in the absence of an object and admits of these two readings an intension-
alist concerning our perceptual vocabulary.7 Perhaps the first intensionalist was
Macbeth himself. Macbeth’s soliloquy continues with him saying to the dagger:
“I have thee not, and yet I see thee still”. But I doubt we can put much weight on
this fact; who knows what Macbeth’s views on perception would have been in a
more collected state of mind.
But there are strong competing intuitions in favor of the idea that Macbeth
does not actually see a dagger, and that the arguments that (2) has a true reading
are specious. It is natural to think that in order to see a dagger, Macbeth must
bear a relation to a particular, concrete dagger; in other words, there seems to
be an intuition that “sees” is semantically on a par with relational expressions
such as “is standing five feet from”, which are fully extensional and existence-
entailing. Since there is no dagger that can serve as a relatum of such a relation,
Macbeth cannot, and so does not, see a dagger.8
One argument in favor of the extensionality of “sees” comes from its retrac-
tion behavior. If “sees” had a reading on which one could see what does not
exist, we would be unable to account for retraction behavior in cases such as (6):
(6) What did you see?
7Importantly, saying that there are two readings of our perceptual verbs, and two readings
of the ascriptions in which they figure, does not entail that these verbs have two different senses;
perceptual verbs need not be lexically ambiguous. Rather, as we will see, in the manner of
intensional transitive verbs more generally, the intensionalist can hold that perceptual verbs
give rise to two different scopal readings of the same ascription, and treat the ambiguity as one
in semantic structure.
8Instead, many authors claim that in this case, Macbeth merely seems to see a dagger.
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Oh nothing, I thought I saw a ghost, but my mind was just playing tricks
on me.
This retraction behavior seems to illustrate the idea that every time we would be
tempted to say that someone has seen a ghost, they could end up being convinced
that there had been some sort of mistake. They did not actually see a ghost, they
only thought they saw one, or seemed to see one. If we were to countenance a
reading of “sees” that is not existence-entailing, we would be unable to explain
the tendency to retract such reports as mistaken once further facts are revealed.
Call someone who holds that the only reading of a perceptual ascription
is an existence-entailing one an extensionalist about our perceptual vocabulary.
According to the extensionalist, the truth-conditions of a perceptual asciption
like (2) are those of a straightforward, existential quantification:
(7) ∃x (dagger(x) & sees(Macbeth,x))
Given that there is no dagger to be seen, (7) must be false. As a consequence,
when we say that Macbeth sees a dagger, we are at best conveying something
true. Macbeth was perhaps also the first to propose the extensionalist view. His
monologue continues with him asking the dagger: “art thou but // A dagger of
the mind, a false creation // Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?”
These two options, however, are not exhaustive; the negative answer to Mac-
beth’s question can take two forms. The extensionalist, as I have characterized
her, holds that since there is no dagger to be seen, there is nothing that Macbeth
sees. However, one might hold that while Macbeth is not seeing a dagger, he is
seeing something else: perhaps a sense-datum. The sense-datum theorist can
thus hold that (8) is true:
(8) Macbeth sees something,
even though (2) is false. The idea that perceptual ascriptions ascribe relations
to sense-data is neither a strictly intensionalist nor strictly extensionalist view.
Since it is not true, on the sense-datum theorist’s view, that Macbeth sees a dag-
ger, it is not an intensionalist view. But since it is likewise not true that there is
a dagger such that Macbeth sees it, it is also not an extensionalist view.9 In what
9There is an approach to intentionality, and the semantics of intensional verbs, that comes
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follows, I will restrict myself to considering what I have called the intensionalist
and extensionalist answers to Macbeth’s question, and ignore the view on which
“sees” is fully relational, but relates Macbeth to something other than a dagger,
such as a sense-datum. As I will construe the situation, quantifications such as
(8) follow from perceptual reports such as (2), but are not generalizations over
other kinds of objects.
2.2. Intensional Transitive Verbs
Intensionalists hold that perceptual ascriptions are existence-neutral in their ob-
ject positions and admit of an ambiguity between two readings: one that entails
the existence of what is perceived and one that does not. They also hold that
these two readings are accompanied by distinct kinds of quantification. However,
these features are not specific to perceptual ascriptions; rather, they are a subset
of the semantic features characteristic of intensional transitive verbs (ITVs).10 Since
one of those three features of ITVs is the failure to entail the existence of the
verb’s direct-object, the question of whether Macbeth can see a dagger is a spe-
cial case of the question of whether “see” is an intensional transitive verb.
Treating the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger as a special case of the question of
whether our perceptual verbs are intensional has several advantages. First, since
the category of intensional transitive verbs is relatively well-understood, it gives
us clear, formal criteria for solving the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger. Second, since
existence-neutrality is one of a family of related intensional features, addressing
the more general question allows us to ask a broader range of questions concern-
ing the semantics of perceptual verbs, and if a verb exhibits these other features
of intensionality, it gives us stronger evidence that the verb exhibits Nonexis-
tence. Third, should it turn out that the intensionalist is correct, we can bring
very close to the sense-datum theorist’s position. Suppose that Ponce is searching for the
fountain of youth. The fountain of youth does not exist. So what is he looking for? One
possibility is that he is looking for an abstract object: he is looking for something, but it is not a
fountain, and is does not have any properties that would render it concrete. Such a view is often
associated with so-called “split readings” of intensional ascriptions, on which the determiner
takes wide scope over the verb but leaves its restrictor inside. On such a view, Ponce is looking
for something that he thinks is a fountain, but which is actually abstract, in the same way that
Macbeth might be seeing a sense-datum that he thinks is a dagger, but turns out not to be.
10Anscombe [1965] was the first person to recognize this, and to argue explicitly that
perceptual verbs are intensional. Anscombe laid out the three traditional features of intensional
transitive verbs and argued that perceptual verbs exhibit these features.
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the tools developed to provide a semantics for ITVs to bear on our perceptual as-
criptions, which will better allow us to specify their truth-conditions. In light of
these advantages, it will be valuable to lay out the features of ITVs more carefully,
and show how Macbeth’s question can be stated in terms of them.
A verb is transitive when it takes a noun phrase in its object position, occur-
ring in sentences of the form NP V NP′. A transitive verb V is intensional when
it occurs in sentences that exhibit at least one of the following three properties.
Nonexistence NP Vs NP′ has a reading which fails to entail NP′ exists, where
NP′ is a positive quantifier, bare plural, or proper name.11
Nonspecificity: NP Vs NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs a particular
NP′.
Opacity: NP Vs NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs NP∗, where NP′,
and NP∗ are extensionally equivalent.
To see these properties in action, let’s consider a canonical example. We can see
that the verb phrase “looking for” exhibits Nonexistence by noting that (9) has
a reading that does not imply (10):
(9) John is looking for the fountain of youth.
(10) The fountain of youth exists.
This establishes that “looking for” exhibits Nonexistence. Further, (11) follows
from (9):
(11) John is looking for something.
But given that there is no fountain of youth, (11) is not equivalent to (12):
(12) There is some thing for which John is looking.
The distinctive form of quantification that we observe in (11) is the same kind
of quantification countenanced by the intensionalist: it is quantification over the
11The restriction to positive quantifiers includes quantified NPs like ‘a dog’, ‘the men who
robbed him’, ‘four gorgons’, and ‘infinitely many numbers’, while excluding negative NPs like
‘no dogs’, ‘no one’, ‘at most three gorgons’, etc.
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complement of a perceptual verb used transitively, and is not existentially com-
mitting. This form of quantification has come to be known as special quantification
[Moltmann, 1997, 2003, 2008, 2013].
“Looking for” also exhibits the second property of ITVs, Nonspecificity.
Consider a case where ‘looking for’ has an indefinite noun phrase in its object
position, such as the following:
(13) John is looking for a capable business partner.
Clearly, there is a reading of (13) that does not entail (14):
(14) John is looking for a particular capable business partner.
John may merely be seeking to share his entrepreneurial tasks with someone he
thinks will help his business, and he might be satisfied with a great number of
different individuals. We can bring this out with the following continuation:
(15) John is looking for a capable business partner—but no one in particular.
On this reading, we likewise observe special quantification: if John is looking for
a capable business partner, he is looking for something, even if not a particular
person. This is clearly not equivalent to the wide-scope quantification:
(16) There is some thing for which John is looking.
Lastly, “looking for” exhibits Opacity: given two coextensive NPs, substitution
of one for another within its complement does not preserve truth:
(17) John is looking for Ortcutt.
(18) John is looking for the shortest spy.
In this case, John might not know that Ortcutt is the shortest spy, and so the goal
of his search may be to find Ortcutt and not the shortest spy. Thus (17) may be
true while (18) is false, which means that ‘looking for’ exhibits Opacity.
These inferential tests indicate that there is a reading of sentences contain-
ing ITVs on which their object-position is not existence-entailing, can receive a
nonspecific interpretation, and resists substitution of co-extensive expressions.
However, there is also a reading that does not have these features. Consider
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John’s search for a capable business partner above. As we saw, John need not be
looking for any particular person. However, he might be, and (13) can also be
used to report just such a search. We can bring out this other kind of search with
the following paraphrase:
(19) There’s a particular capable business partner for whom John is looking.
The truth-conditions of (19) differ from those of the reading which we brought
out with (15) above. This indicates that (13) ambiguous between two readings.
While these two readings go by many names in the semantic literature, I will
officially call the reading brought out by (19) the de re reading of (13), and the
reading brought out in (15) its de dicto reading. However, I will also sometimes
use the terms “intensional” and “extensional”, or the evocative Quinean termi-
nology of “notional” and “relational”, for the de dicto and de re readings. The key
feature of the de dicto, or notional reading of an ascription involving an ITV is
that it can be true whether or not the de re reading is true, which is why the de
dicto reading is sometimes said to be “existence neutral”. Importantly, the pres-
ence of the de dicto reading is posited as the best explanation for the failure of
the three inferences above.
However, while paradigmatic ITVs exhibit all three of the features just out-
lined, along with the de re/de dicto ambiguity, the three features are not always
present together. Many other verbs demonstrate that the three features are
separable. Typically, Nonexistence and Nonspecificity are present together,
while Opacity is sometimes seen as separable, and the result of a different phe-
nomenon.12 Further, semanticists differ on which of the three features they take
as criterial for membership in the category of ITVs. For instance, Moltmann
[1997, 2008, 2013] takes the presence of Nonspecificity to be the definitive fea-
ture of ITVs. In what follows, we will see that perceptual verbs differ in the
features of the intensionality that they exhibit. Some perceptual verbs exhibit
only some of features of intensionality, while others appear to exhibit all three
12For instance, Forbes [2006] uses one mechanism to account for Nonexistence and Nonspeci-
ficity, and another to account for Opacity. The tendency to treat Opacity as distinct from the
other two properties originated with Fodor [1970], who held that Nonspecificity and Opacity
can vary independently, and four different readings are available, one corresponding to each of
combination of the presence and absence of each of the properties. For subsequent responses
to and defenses of Fodor, see Keshet [2008, 2011] and Szabó [2010, 2011].
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features, and so appear to be paradigmatically intensional.
With these properties in place, we can now state the puzzle of Macbeth’s dag-
ger in terms of them. The basic puzzle, stated above, is whether “sees” exhibits
Nonexistence. If it does exhibit nonexistence, then (20) has a reading on which
it is true, even when there is no dagger to be seen:
(20) Macbeth sees a dagger.
This reading is the de dicto reading, which accounts for the features of intension-
ality when they are present. We also have a clear way of stating the intension-
alist’s position on the kinds of quantifiers that generalize over the complements
of perceptual verbs: the intensionalist holds that these quantifiers are special
quantifiers, whereas the extensionalist holds that they are ordinary, existential
quantifications.
3. Nonexistence
In this section I present three studies that attempt to resolve the question of
whether perceptual verbs exhibit Nonexistence. The initial two studies, Experi-
ments 1 and 2, tested three perceptual verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for
Nonexistence, while Experiment 3 tested a wider range of verbs for this prop-
erty.
3.1. Experiment 1
The first study tested “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for Nonexistence using a
simple methodology.
3.1.1. Methods
In the study, 202 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.13 Each participant
was asked five questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
13Participants in this study, and all of the studies presented here, were recruited using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants in Experiment 1 were English speakers, 54.7% male,
average age 34.5, with 45% having at least a bachelor’s degree. However, one limitation of the
study was that, while English fluency was a requirement to participate, it was not possible
to verify that speakers were native speakers of English. This may have had some effect on the
results, although since the sample size was relatively large for a study of this kind, there is
reason to think that the results are still detecting a genuine pattern in English usage.
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each involved a different one of the following five verbs: “touch”, “see”, “per-
ceive”, “sense”, and “search for”. Of the five verbs, one verb, “touch”, is paradig-
matically extensional, another, “search for”, is paradigmatically intensional, and
three verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense”, are perceptual verbs. To make sure
that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the questions, par-
ticipants were then assigned randomly to one of three vignettes: (Elf, Panda, or
Extra-terrestrial).
To test for Nonexistence, each participant was asked to suppose that a cer-
tain kind of entity did not exist, and then asked whether John could touch, see,
perceive, sense, or search for such an entity. For example, participants assigned
to the first vignette, Elf, received the following five questions:
Touch Suppose that there are no elves. We want to know: is it possible for John
to touch an elf?
See Suppose that there are no elves. We want to know: is it possible for John to
see an elf?
Perceive Suppose that there are no elves. We want to know: is it possible for
John to perceive an elf?
Sense Suppose that there are no elves. We want to know: is it possible for John
to sense an elf?
Search for Suppose that there are no elves. We want to know: is it possible for
John to search for an elf?
The other vignettes differed only in that they had a different indefinite NP in
place of “an elf”; the other two vignettes used “a purple panda” and “an extra-
terrestrial”, respectively. Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point
Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely not” and 7
indicating “definitely yes”. Since the goal of the experiment was to determine
whether there is an entailment between touching, seeing, perceiving, sensing,
and searching for an elf and the existence of elves, the questions were posed
modally. If a participant responded with a high number, it indicated that the par-
ticipant took there to be a possible situation in which the premise of the Nonex-
istence inference is true and its conclusion is false, which is just to say that the
participant took the verb to exhibit Nonexistence.
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The study then investigated participant responses by comparing the average
scores for the questions involving perceptual verbs to both the average scores of
the questions involving the paradigmatically intensional and extensional verbs,
and to the scores of the other perceptual verbs. Since paradigmatic intensional
verbs exhibit all three features of intensionality, along with the de re/de dicto
ambiguity, the closer a perceptual verb’s ratings were to the paradigmatically
intensional or extensional verb, the more evidence we have that the perceptual
verb exhibits or lacks the relevant feature of intensionality, and gives rise to the
reading that explains this feature. Given that the study also compared perceptual
verbs to each other, we were also able to determine differences between the three
perceptual verbs with respect to Nonexistence. Thus it was not primarily the
absolute scores of the perceptual verbs that mattered, but rather the degree to
which they differed or failed to differ from the intensional and extensional verbs,
and from each other.14
3.1.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the three vignettes can be found
in Figure 1. The ratings for all three perceptual verbs were intermediate: they
differed significantly from the paradigmatically intensional verb, “search”, the
paradigmatically extensional verb, “touch”, and from each other.15 However, the
ratings for “perceive” were much closer to those for “search”, while the ratings
for “see” and “sense” were both closer to those for “touch”. These results were
14It is important that each pair of questions within each vignette is minimal: they differ
only in the verb they involve. Thus, absent interaction effects, any differences in participant
responses can be attributed to differences in meaning between the verbs. Thus, pointing out
that certain noun phrases are more apt to lead to intensional or extensional readings does
not account for the core data, which concern the differences between perceptual verbs and
paradigmatically intensional and extensional verbs.
15The results were analyzed using a 5 (verb: touch vs. see vs. perceive vs. sense vs. search)
× 3 (vignette: elf vs. panda vs. extra-terrestrial) mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a
significant effect of verb, F(4, 796) = 215.34, p < .001, but no significant effect of vignette,
F(2, 199) = .661, p = .518, and no significant interaction, F(8, 796) = .862, p = .549. To explore
the differences between the verbs, I compared the verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple
comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjustment. Unsurprisingly, participants gave higher ratings
for “search” (M = 5.47, SD = 2.26) than for “touch” (M = 1.34, SD = .985), p < .001. Ratings
for “perceive” (M = 3.89, SD = 2.27) were significantly higher than the ratings for “touch”,
p < .001, and significantly lower than those for “search”, p < 001. The ratings for “sees”
(M = 1.94, SD = 1.73) and “sense” (M = 2.28, SD = 1.78) also differed significantly from both
“touch” and “search”, in both cases with p < .001.
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Figure 1: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
consistent across the three vignettes.
3.1.3. Discussion
The results above show that there are statistically significant differences between
all of the verbs. If we rank that verbs from least intensional to most intensional,
as expected, “touch” is the most extensional, “see”, “sense”, and “perceive”, are
intermediate, and “search for” is the most intensional. The largest jump between
verbs occurs between “sense” and “perceive”, and the midpoint between paradig-
matically intensional and paradigmatically extensional occurs between these two
verbs.
There is an important question to address before drawing any conclusions
from these results. The features of intensionality are ordinarily treated as bi-
nary notions: the features are either present or absent. But the results above are
given on a scale; they are not binary. What can we conclude from the fact that
perceptual verbs fall closer to paradigmatically intensional or extensional verbs
on such a scale, but still differ statistically from them? One possibility is that
this data cannot be accommodated in the standard framework for thinking about
intensionality, and requires a new framework. On this view, instead of treating
the presence of a feature of intensionality as best explained by the availability of
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an intensional reading, each feature of intensionality would be associated with
a scale, and verbs that differ from each other statistically with respect to that
feature would occupy different groups or tiers along that scale.
While I will not settle this issue completely here, and I am open to the idea
that there is a scale of intensionality, I do not think that the results presented in
this paper require a drastic departure from the standard framework. Two facts
count in favor of remaining semantically conservative in this way.
First, there is an important difference between many speakers rating verbs as
intermediate on a scale, and speakers rating verbs as either intensional or exten-
sional in ways that average out to an intermediate rating. We need to investigate
whether the mean scores for “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” are the result of many
speakers giving intermediate scores, or whether they are the result of averaging a
bimodal distribution. If the distribution is bimodal, we can conclude that the in-
termediate ratings are due the fact that some speakers hear intensional readings
while others do not, while maintaining that, relative to a speaker, intensionality
is binary.
This question is partially addressed in Appendix A, which contains the his-
tograms for each verb in the initial studies for each property. In the case of
Nonexistence, these histograms reveal that while the mean for “see” differed
statistically from that for “touch”, this is not the result of speakers providing
intermediate ratings for “see”. Rather, it is the result of averaging the large ma-
jority that rated “see” as perfectly extensional with the minority that did not.
Further, as one can see, the distributions for “touch” and “see” were remark-
ably similar. The histograms also reveal that the higher mean for “perceive” is
the result of a bimodal distribution in which the probability mass leans toward
the intensional: many people hold that “perceive” exhibits Nonexistence, while
some do not. While there are some intermediate readings, the higher mean ob-
served for “perceive” is the result of a high proportion of speakers rating it as
fully intensional.
Second, even if a verb differs statistically from another due to speaker varia-
tion, as “see” did from “touch” in Experiment 1, this does not entail that we need
an altogether new intensional status for the verb. Rather, in giving a semantic
theory for English, we are trying to give the best explanation and summary of
the inferential patterns that speakers endorse, perhaps together with the strength
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of their endorsement. The best explanation may hold that a verb is extensional—
and lacks an intensional reading in English—even while there is variation among
speakers concerning a particular inference, or while some speakers are not per-
fectly confident of this. Thus, we can see the fact that a majority of speakers
take the verb to be fully extensional, while some do not, as evidence for the
extensionality of the verb in English, rather than as constituting a new tier of
intensionality for that property. With this view in hand, nothing requires us to
draw the boundary between intensional and extensional verbs at the lowest point
on the scale.
Adopting this explanatory approach allows us to take the proximity of a
verb to the paradigmatically intensional or extensional case as a piece of data
that needs to be explained by a semantic theory. Even when a verb differs sta-
tistically from such paradigmatic cases, if its overall distribution of scores across
a range of experiments is close to that of a paradigm case, this fact can be ex-
plained by positing or not positing an intensional reading. Going forward, I will
assume this strategy. I will treat the proximity of a perceptual verb’s scores to a
paradigm case as a datum that needs to be explained by positing or not positing
an intensional reading. While I recognize that a more drastic departure from the
standard semantic approach might provide a more fine-grained classification, I
preserve the standard semantic view for simplicity and ease of explanation.
3.2. Experiment 2
The second study tested “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for Nonexistence, but
made use of a different prompt.16 The variation in the prompt was intended to
address the worry that Experiment 1 did not call attention to the fact that many
people in fact do believe in various kinds of non-existent or imagined objects.
Experiment 2 brought this fact to salience.
16I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Erkenntnis for suggesting this follow-up variation
on the experiment.
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3.2.1. Methods
In the study, 213 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.17 Each participant
was asked five questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
each involved a different one of the following five verbs: “touch”, “see”, “per-
ceive”, “sense”, and “search for”. Of the five verbs, one verb, “touch”, is paradig-
matically extensional, another, “search for”, is paradigmatically intensional, and
three verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense”, are perceptual verbs. To make sure
that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the questions, par-
ticipants were then assigned randomly to one of three vignettes: (Elf, Panda, or
Extra-terrestrial).
To test for Nonexistence, participants assigned to the Elf vignette were
given the following prompt:
Elf Suppose there are actually no elves, but some people believe in their exis-
tence, and there are occasional reports of people encountering them, though
these reports are in fact just due to people’s vivid imaginations.
Each participant was then asked to answer the following five questions, in ran-
dom order:
Touched In light of these circumstances, it is possible that your friend Sally
touched an elf today?
Saw In light of these circumstances, it is possible that your friend Sally saw an
elf today?
Perceived In light of these circumstances, it is possible that your friend Sally
perceived an elf today?
Sensed In light of these circumstances, it is possible that your friend Sally sensed
an elf today?
Searched for In light of these circumstances, it is possible that your friend Sally
searched for an elf today?
17Participants were English speakers, 56.5% of whom were male, average age 29.8, with
79.8% having at least a bachelor’s degree.
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Figure 2: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
The other vignettes differed only in that they had a different indefinite NP in
place of “an elf”; the other two vignettes used “a purple panda” and “an extra-
terrestrial”, respectively. Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point
Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely not” and
7 indicating “definitely yes”. Again, since the goal of the experiment was to
determine whether there is an entailment between touching, seeing, perceiving,
sensing, and searching for an elf and the existence of elves, the questions were
posed modally. If a participant responded with a high number, it indicated that
the participant took there to be a possible situation in which the premise of the
Nonexistence inference is true and its conclusion is false, which is just to say
that the participant took the verb to exhibit Nonexistence.
3.2.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the three vignettes can be found
in Figure 2. The ratings for all three perceptual verbs were again intermediate,
and they differed significantly both from the paradigmatically intensional verb,
“search”, the paradigmatically extensional verb, “touch”, and from each other.18
18The results were analyzed using a 5 (verb: touch vs. see vs. perceive vs. sense vs. search)
× 3 (vignette: elf vs. panda vs. extra-terrestrial) mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was
An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger · 19
These results were consistent across the vignettes.
3.2.3. Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we observed statistical differences between each of the
verbs.19 However, the differences in the means between each verb were signif-
icantly attenuated; the difference between the highest and lowest mean score
was only 1.32. Thus, bringing imagination to salience, and mentioning that there
are reports that such things exist, decreased the differences between the verbs
dramatically. But in spite of these changes, the ordinal ranking of intensionality
for the verbs remained constant; “touch” was least intensional, followed by “see”,
“sense”, and “perceive”, with “search for” being the most intensional. This pro-
vides us with some evidence that the results from the previous experiment—at
least the patterns of statistical difference and the ordinal ranking with respect to
Nonexistence—were not due to peculiarities of experimental design. The next
experiment provides further evidence for this conclusion.
3.3. Experiment 3
The third study tested seven perceptual verbs—“see”, “hear”, “smell”, “touch”,
“feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation of”—for Nonexistence.20 Unlike in the
previous experiments, this study provided participants with a brief description
of the goals of the study, along with examples of paradigmatically intensional
and extensional verbs, and of how such verbs behave with respect to the ques-
tions participants were asked to answer. These additions were made with the
intention of forestalling misunderstandings of the task, solidifying participants’
a significant effect of verb, F(4, 840) = 36.64, p < .001, but no significant effect of vignette,
F(2, 210) = .496, p = .610, and no significant interaction, F(8, 840) = .671, p = .718. To explore
the differences between the verbs, I compared the verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple
comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjustment. Unsurprisingly, participants gave higher ratings
for “searched for” (M = 5.47, SD = 1.341) than for “touched” (M = 4.15, SD = 2.186), p < .001.
Ratings for “perceived” (M = 5.16, SD = 1.603) were significantly higher than the ratings for
“touch”, p < .001, and significantly lower than those for “search”, p = .049. The ratings for
“saw” (M = 4.41, SD = 2.087) differed significantly from “touched” (p = .001) and “searched
for” (p < .001), as did the rating for “sensed”(M = 4.81, SD = 1.826), in both cases with
p < .001.
19Although “perceived” and “searched for” differed only with p = .049.
20Participants were English speakers, 58.7%male, average age 33.3, with 67.5% of participants
having at least a bachelor’s degree.
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grasp of the categories of intensional and extensional verbs, and providing them
with clear paradigm cases of verbs in each category.
3.3.1. Methods
In the study, 219 participants filled out a brief questionnaire. Each participant
was asked nine questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
they each involved a different one of the following nine verbs: “see”, “hear”,
“smell”, “touch”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation of”, “kick”, or “search”,
where “kick” is paradigmatically extensional, “search for” is paradigmatically
intensional, and the remainder of the verbs are perceptual verbs.21 To make
sure that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the questions,
participants were then assigned randomly to one of four vignettes: Panda, Extra-
terrestrial, Dragon, or Dodo.
To test for Nonexistence, participants in the Dragon vignette were given the
following instructions:
This study concerns the meanings of certain verbs in English.
Some verbs can only relate people to things that exist. Others do not
have this restriction. Consider two examples:
Since unicorns don’t exist, it is not possible for John to ride a unicorn,
but it is possible for him to want a unicorn. We are trying to deter-
mine whether a specific collection of verbs behaves more like “ride”
or more like “want”.
In order to determine this, suppose that you know that dragons don’t
exist, but your friend John doesn’t.
21Experiment 3—like, as we will see, Experiments 5 and 7—involved a broader range of
perceptual verbs. The goal of testing this broader range was first to locate “perceive” and
“sense” within this broader category. Doing so allows us to compare “see” and “perceive” to
other perceptual verbs, in the hope of gleaning additional insights. But studying a broader
range of perceptual verbs also has intrinsic interest for those interested in sensory modalities
other than vision. Additionally, Experiments 3, 5, and 7 differed from the other studies in that
they made use of “have a sensation of” as opposed to “sense”. The reason for this change
is that “sense” has a strong cognitive, non-perceptual interpretation, which dominates its
perceptual use. Of course, other perceptual verbs likewise have cognitive readings, but the goal
of switching from “sense” to “have a sensation of” was to restrict attention to sensations, which
are only present in conscious perceptual states.
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Then answer the following questions:22
Is it possible for John to see a dragon?
Is it possible for John to hear a dragon?
Is it possible for John to smell a dragon?
Is it possible for John to touch a dragon?
Is it possible for John to feel a dragon?
Is it possible for John to perceive a dragon?
Is it possible for John to have a sensation of a dragon?
Is it possible for John to search for a dragon?
Is it possible for John to kick a dragon?
The other vignettes differed only in that they had a different indefinite NP in
place of “an dragon”; the other three vignettes used “a purple panda”, “an extra-
terrestrial”, and “a dodo”, respectively. Participants responded to the questions
on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely
not” and 7 indicating “definitely yes”. As with experiments 1 and 2, the ques-
tions were posed modally. If a participant responded with a high number, it
indicated that the participant took there to be a possible situation in which the
premise of the Nonexistence inference is true and its conclusion is false, which
is just to say that the participant took the verb to exhibit Nonexistence.
3.3.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the four vignettes can be found in
Figure 3. Beginning with the paradigmatically extensional case, the results show
that two verbs did not differ significantly from “kick”: “smell” and “touch”.
Shifting our attention to “see”, we found that while “see” did differ statistically
from “kick”, it did not differ statistically from “hear”, “smell”, or “feel”. Thus,
“see” was in a cluster of verbs some of which did not differ statistically from
fully extensional verbs such as “kick” and “touch”, and whose means were close
to that of the paradigmatically extensional verb “kick”. By contrast, “perceive”
22After being presented with the instructions, participants were presented with the questions
all at once, but in a random order. The instructions and examples remained on the screen.
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Figure 3: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
had a much higher mean, and differed statistically from every other verb in the
experiment, including “search for”.23
3.4. Discussion
Since this experiment did not involve the verb “sense”, but instead made use of a
closely related verbal lexeme, “have a sensation of”, the results cannot be directly
compared to those of Experiments 1 and 2. However, with respect to “touch”,
“see”, “perceive”, and “search for”, this study replicated the results that we ob-
served in the previous two experiments. All of these verbs differed statistically
23The results were analyzed using a 9 (verb: see vs. hear vs. smell vs. touch vs. feel vs.
perceive vs. have a sensation of vs. search for vs. kick) × 4 (vignette: dragon vs. panda vs.
extra-terrestrial vs. dodo) mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant effect of verb,
F(8, 1720) = 147.44, p < .001, but no significant effect of vignette, F(3, 215) = .387, p = .762,
and a significant interaction, F(24, 1720) = 1.57, p = .04. To explore the differences between the
verbs, I compared the verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s
adjustment. As expected, the highest mean was for “searched for” (M = 6.02, SD = 1.52) while
the lowest was for kick (M = 2.44, SD = 2.04). Ratings for “perceived” (M = 4.74, SD = 2.01)
were significantly higher than the ratings for “kick”, p < .001, “touch” (M = 2.60, SD = 2.168),
p < .001, and “have a sensation of” (M = 4.15, SD = 2.19), p = .003, and significantly
lower than those for “search for” (p < .001). The ratings for “see” (M = 2.92, SD = 2.20)
differed significantly from “kicked” (p < .001) and “searched for” (p < .001), but not from
“hear” (M = 2.89, SD = 2.215), p = 1.000), “smell” (M = 2.66, SD = 2.16), p = .140) or “feel”
(M = 2.71, SD = 2.20), p = 1.000.
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from one another, and we observed the same ordinal ranking of Nonexistence
scores. Further, “have a sensation of” behaved very much like “sense” did in
the previous two experiments: it occupied the same place in the ordering, and
differed statistically from the other verbs in the exact same ways. Further, like in
Experiment 1, but unlike in Experiment 2, we observed large differences between
the means of each of the verbs. Again, while “see” was not perfectly extensional,
its mean (2.92) was much closer to the mean for “kick” (2.44) than the mean for
“search for” (6.02). Likewise, the mean for “perceive” (4.74) was much closer to
the mean of the paradigmatically intensional verb “search for” than it was to the
mean for “kick”. Thus, the results of Experiment 3 offer further support for the
general pattern we observed in Experiments 1 and 2: scores for “see” are much
closer to those of the paradigmatically extensional than intensional verb, while
the opposite is the case for “perceive”.
4. Nonspecificity
4.1. Experiment 4
The fourth study tested “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for Nonspecificity using
a simple methodology.
4.1.1. Methods
In the study, 222 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.24 Each partici-
pant was asked five questions, in random order. The questions differed only
in that they each involved a different one of the following five verbs: “touch”,
“see”, “perceive”, “sense”, and “look for”.25 Of the five verbs, one verb, “touch”,
is paradigmatically extensional, another, “look for”, is paradigmatically inten-
sional, and three verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense”, are perceptual verbs. To
make sure that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the ques-
tions, participants were then assigned randomly to one of three vignettes (Dog,
Car, or Mouse).
24Participants were English speakers, 46.9% male, average age 32.3, with 65.2% having at
least a bachelor’s degree.
25Experiments 2 and 3 differed slightly from Experiment 1 in that they made use of the
paradigmatically intensional verb + preposition combination “look for”, as opposed to “search
for”.
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To test for Nonspecificity, we asked participants whether they could touch,
see, perceive, sense, or search for an object of the relevant kind, without touch-
ing, seeing, perceiving, sensing, or searching for a particular object. For instance,
participants assigned to the first vignette, Dog, received the following five ques-
tions:
Touch Suppose that John is touching a dog. Is it possible that John is touching
a dog, but not a particular one?
See Suppose that John sees a dog. Is it possible that John sees a dog, but not a
particular one?
Perceive Suppose that John perceives a dog. Is it possible that John perceives a
dog, but not a particular one?
Sense Suppose that John senses a dog. Is it possible that John senses a dog, but
not a particular one?
Look for Suppose that John is looking for a dog. Is it possible that John is look-
ing for a dog, but not a particular one?
The questions associated with the other vignettes differed from the above ques-
tions only in that they had a different NP in place of “a dog”; the other vignettes,
Car and Mouse, made use of “a car” and “a mouse”, respectively. Participants
responded to the questions on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indi-
cating a response of “definitely not” and 7 indicating “definitely yes”. Thus, if a
participant responded with a high number, it indicated that the participant took
there to be a possible situation in which the premise of the Nonspecificity in-
ference is true and its conclusion is false, which is just to say that the participant
took the verb to exhibit Nonspecificity. A low score indicated the opposite.
As with the previous study, Experiment 2 investigated participant responses
by comparing the average scores for the questions involving perceptual verbs
to both the average scores of the questions involving the paradigmatically in-
tensional and extensional verbs, and to the scores of the other perceptual verbs.
Again, the closer a perceptual verb’s ratings were to the paradigmatically inten-
sional or extensional verb, the more evidence we have that the perceptual verb
exhibits or lacks the relevant feature of intensionality—in this case, Nonspeci-
ficity. As with the last study, the absolute scores of the verbs mattered less than
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Figure 4: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 4. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
the comparisons to the paradigmatically intensional and extensional verbs and
to each other.
4.1.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the three vignettes can be found in
Figure 4. The results of this study were more decisive: the perceptual verbs split
into two groups. “Perceive” and “sense” differed significantly from “touch”, but
did not differ significantly from “look for”. By contrast, “see” did not differ from
“touch”, but differed significantly from “perceive”, “sense”, and “look for”. This
pattern was consistent across the three vignettes.26 This indicates that “perceive”
26The results were analyzed using a 5 (verb: touch vs. see vs. perceive vs. sense vs. search) ×
3 (vignette: dog vs. car vs. mouse) mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant effect of
verb, F(4, 876) = 28.26, p < .001, but no significant effect of vignette, F(2, 219) = .907, p = .518,
and no significant interaction, F(8, 876) = .862, p = .952. To explore the differences between the
verbs, I compared the verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s
adjustment. Unsurprisingly, participants gave higher ratings for “search” (M = 5.47, SD = 1.75)
than for “touch” (M = 4.17, SD = 2.29), p < .001. Ratings for “perceive” (M = 5.04, SD = 1.87)
were significantly higher than the ratings for “touch”, p < .001, but did not differ significantly
from those for “search”, p = .084. The ratings “sense” (M = 5.14, SD = 1.78) also differed
significantly from “touch”, p < .001 “search”, but did not differ from “search”, p = .249.
Contrarily, the average rating for “sees” did not differ from that of “touch”, p = 1.000, but did
differ significantly from “search”, p < .001.
26 · Justin D’Ambrosio
and “sense” are as apt to receive nonspecific readings as “look for”, but in the
case of “see”, such readings are not available.
4.1.3. Discussion
If we restrict ourselves to considering only “see” and “perceive”, then the results
of Experiment 2 are consonant with the results of Experiments 1 and 2. Experi-
ment 1 showed that “see” was close to paradigmatically extensional with respect
to Nonexistence, while “perceive” behaved much more intensionally. The re-
sults of Experiment 2 likewise show that “perceive” exhibits intensional behav-
ior, while “see” does not. However, “senses” behaved differently with respect
to Nonspecificity than it did with respect to Nonexistence. In Experiment
1, “senses” patterned with “touch”, while in this experiment, “sense” patterned
with “search for”. Thus, this experiment gives us further evidence for our con-
clusions concerning “see” and “perceive” from the Nonexistence studies, but re-
vealed that “sense” exhibited different behavior with respect to Nonspecificity
than it did with respect to Nonexistence.27
4.2. Experiment 5
The fifth study broadened the scope of the fourth by testing seven perceptual
verbs—“see”, “hear”, “smell”, “touch”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation
of”—for Nonspecificity. Unlike in Experiments 1, 2, and 4, but like Experiment
3, this study provided participants with a brief description of the goals of the
study, along with examples of paradigmatic intensional and extensional verbs,
and how they behave with respect to the questions participants were asked to
answer. Again, these additions were made with the intention of forestalling
misunderstandings of the task, solidifying participants’ grasp of the categories
27The behavior of “sense” is somewhat strange, given that nonexistence and nonspecificity
are often explained by the same mechanism (see, for instance, Forbes [2006]). However,
there are some existence-entailing verbs that do not require specificity. These verbs have an
“incorporated” semantics: indefinites in their object positions take obligatory narrow scope, and
are nonspecific, but are existence-entailing. Examples of such constructions are incorporated
VPs such as “mouse-caught” or “salmon-ate”. The incorporated status of the nominal gives
it a nonspecific interpretation, but the extensionality of the verb entails that there must be
something that was caught or eaten. See Dayal [2003, 2011] and van Geenhoven [1998] for further
discussion. The connection between intensional transitive verbs and semantic incorporation is
discussed at length by van Geenhoven and McNally [2005].
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of intensional and extensional verbs, and providing them with clear paradigm
cases of verbs in each category.
4.2.1. Methods
In the study, 214 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.28 Each participant
was asked nine questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
they each involved a different one of the following nine verbs: “see”, “hear”,
“smell”, “touch”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation of”, “search for”, or
“kick”, where “kick” is paradigmatically extensional, “search for” is paradigmat-
ically intensional, and the remainder of the verbs are perceptual verbs. To make
sure that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the questions,
participants were then assigned randomly to one of three vignettes: Cow, Pig, or
Chicken.
To test for Nonspecificity, participants in the Cow vignette were given the
following instructions:
This study concerns the meanings of certain verbs in English.
Some verbs relate people only to specific objects, while others do not
require such specificity.
For example, if John is riding a horse, he must be riding a particular
horse. But if John wants a horse, he might not want a particular horse.
He might just want any old horse, or simply a horse that canters well.
Keeping these examples in mind, please answer the following ques-
tions:29
Is it possible for John to see a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to hear a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to smell a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to touch a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to feel a cow, but not a particular one?
28Participants were English speakers, 59.2% male, average age 33, with 66.8% having at least
a bachelor’s degree.
29After being presented with the instructions, participants were presented with the questions
all at once, but in a random order. The instructions and examples remained on the screen.
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Is it possible for John to perceive a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to have a sensation of a cow, but not a partic-
ular one?
Is it possible for John to search for a cow, but not a particular one?
Is it possible for John to kick a cow, but not a particular one?
The other vignettes differed only in that they had a different indefinite NP in
place of “a cow”; the other two vignettes used “a pig”, “a chicken”, respectively.
Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer
of 1 indicating a response of “definitely not” and 7 indicating “definitely yes”.
As with the previous experiments, the questions were posed modally. If a partic-
ipant responded with a high number, it indicated that the participant took there
to be a possible situation in which the premise of the Nonspecificity inference
is true and its conclusion is false, which is just to say that the participant took
the verb to exhibit Nonspecificity.
4.2.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the four vignettes can be found
in Figure 5. The most notable result is that “see” did not differ statistically from
“touch”, “feel”, or “kick”. Meanwhile, “perceive” did not differ statistically from
“hear”, “smell”, or “have a sensation of”. However, “see” did differ statistically
from, and had a lower rating than, “hear”, “smell”, “perceive”, “have a sensation
of”, and “search for”.30
30The results were analyzed using a 9 (verb: see vs. hear vs. smell vs. touch vs. feel vs.
perceive vs. have a sensation of vs. search for vs. kick) × 3 (vignette: pig vs. cow vs. chicken)
mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant effect of verb, F(8, 1688) = 59.14, p < .001,
but no significant effect of vignette, F(2, 211) = .898, p = .409, and no significant interaction,
F(16, 1688) = .617, p = .873. To explore the differences between the verbs, I compared the
verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjustment. As expected,
the highest mean was for “searched for” (M = 5.57, SD = 1.87) while the lowest was for
kick (M = 2.98, SD = 2.362). Ratings for “perceived” (M = 5.04, SD = 2.02) were significantly
higher than the ratings for “kick” (p < .001) and “touch” (M = 3.2, SD = p < .001), significantly
lower than those for “search for”, p < .001, but did not differ statistically from “hear” (M =
4.62, SD = 2.342), p = 1.000, “smell” (M = 4.93, SD = 2.178), p = 1.000, or “have a sensation
of” (M = 4.7, SD = 2.105), p = 1.000. The ratings for “see” (M = 3.31, SD = 2.33) differed
significantly from “kicked” (p < .001) and “searched for” (p < .001), but not from “touch”
(M = 3.2, SD = 2.436), p = 1.000, “feel” (M = 3.03, SD = 2.296), p = 1.000, or “kick”, p = 5.17.
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Figure 5: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 5. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
4.2.3. Discussion
These results are consistent with the results of our previous experiment, and
broadly reinforce the results of the three Nonexistence experiments. Here we
find that there is a cluster of verbs—including “see”—that behave like paradig-
matically extensional verbs with respect to Nonspecificity—they can only be
interpreted specifically in their object positions. Every verb in this cluster con-
trasts with every verb in the more intensional cluster, which included “hear”,
“smell”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation of”. This reinforces the idea that “see”
behaves extensionally, but “perceives” is much more like an intensional verb.
While “perceive” did differ statistically from “search for”, its mean (5.04) was
much closer to that of “search for” (5.57) than “kick” (2.98). Thus, as in every
previous experiment, “perceive” falls on the intensional side of the spectrum.
Also, in this experiment, “have a sensation of” behaved roughly like “sense” did
in Experiment 3: it was more intensional, but still differed significantly from
“search for”.
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5. Opacity
5.1. Experiment 6
The sixth study tested “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” for Opacity using a simple
methodology.
5.1.1. Methods
In the study, 199 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.31 Each participant
was asked five questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
they each involved a different one of the following five verbs: “touch”, “see”,
“perceive”, “sense”, and “search for”. Of the five verbs, one verb, “touch”, is
paradigmatically extensional, another, “search for”, is paradigmatically inten-
sional, and three verbs, “see”, “perceive”, and “sense”, are perceptual verbs. To
make sure that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the ques-
tions, participants were then assigned randomly to one of three vignettes (Spy,
Butler, or Wife).
For instance, participants assigned to Butler received the following five ques-
tions:
Touch Suppose that John is touching the butler, say by shaking his hand. But
unbeknownst to John, the butler is the murderer. Is it possible that John
isn’t touching the murderer?
See Suppose that John sees the butler in the kitchen. But unbeknownst to John,
the butler is the murderer. Is it possible that John doesn’t see the murderer
in the kitchen?
Perceive Suppose that John perceives the butler in the kitchen. But unbeknownst
to John, the butler is the murderer. Is it possible that John doesn’t perceive
the murderer in the kitchen?
Sense Suppose that John senses the butler in the kitchen. But unbeknownst to
John, the butler is the murderer. Is it possible that John doesn’t sense the
murderer in the kitchen?
31Participants were English speakers, 54.7% male, average age 33.4, with 67.1% having at
least a bachelor’s degree.
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Look for Suppose that John is looking for the butler. But unbeknownst to John,
the butler is the murderer. Is it possible that John isn’t looking for the
murderer?
The questions associated with the other vignettes differed from the above ques-
tions only in that they had different NPs in place of “the butler” and “the mur-
derer”. The Spy vignette made use of “Ortcutt” and “the shortest spy”, while the
Wife vignette made use of “his wife” and “the most dangerous Russian spy”. Par-
ticipants responded to the questions on a 7-point Likert scale, with an answer of 1
indicating a response of “definitely not” and 7 indicating “definitely yes”. Thus,
if a participant responded with a high number, it indicated that the participant
took there to be a possible situation in which the premise of the Opacity infer-
ence is true and its conclusion is false, which is just to say that the participant
took the verb to exhibit Opacity. A low score indicated the opposite.
Similarly to the studies above, this study compared the average scores for
the questions involving perceptual verbs to both the average scores of the ques-
tions involving the paradigmatically intensional and extensional verbs, and to
the scores of the other perceptual verbs, and drew conclusions concerning the
intensionality of the perceptual verbs by comparison.
5.1.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the three vignettes can be found in
Figure 6. Similarly to the results concerning Nonspecificity, neither “perceive”
nor “sense” differed from the paradigmatically intensional verb + preposition
combination “look for”, while both differed significantly from the paradigmati-
cally extensional verb “touch”.32 Somewhat strangely, “see” also did not differ
32The results were analyzed using a 5 (verb: touch vs. see vs. perceive vs. sense vs.
look for) × 3 (vignette: spy vs. butler vs. wife) mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a
significant effect of verb, F(4, 784) = 21.55, p < .001. Somewhat strangely, there was also an
effect of vignette, F(2, 196) = 7.699, p = .001, although there was no significant interaction,
F(8, 784) = 1.294, p = .243. One of the vignettes had overall lower scores, perhaps due to
the fact that one set of descriptions used perceptually available properties: the Spy vignette
made use of an NP “the shortest spy”, one component of which—“height”—was perceptually
available, in contrast to the other NPs. However, in this study, there was also variation between
vignettes in the kinds of NPs used. Perhaps the combination of a proper name “Ortcutt”
and a definite description “the shortest spy” combined to yield noticeably lower scores for
that vignette. To explore the differences between the verbs, I compared the verbs pairwise,
correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjustment. Unsurprisingly, participants
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Figure 6: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 6. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
significantly from “look for”, but it did differ significantly from “touch”, “per-
ceive”, and “sense”. Thus, while “see” had an intermediate rating with respect
to Opacity, the fact that it did not differ statistically from “look for” indicates
that “see” exhibits Opacity.
5.1.3. Discussion
The results of this experiment seem to show that all three of the perceptual
verbs—“see”, “sense”, and “perceive”—pattern with the paradigamtically inten-
sional verb “search for”, and so appear to resist substitution within their com-
plements. In contrast to the previous two experiments, “see” did not differ sta-
tistically from the paradigmatically intensional verbs “look for”, but did differ
significantly from “touch”. It also did not differ statistically from “perceive” or
“sense”. Thus, “touch” seems to be alone among the fully allowing for substitu-
gave higher ratings for “search” (M = 4.41, SD = 2.17) than for “touch” (M = 3.27, SD = 2.2),
p < .001. Ratings for “perceive” (M = 4.5, SD = 2.09) were significantly higher than the ratings
for “touch”, p < .001, but did not differ significantly from those for “look for”, p = 1.000. The
ratings for “sense” (M = 5.14, SD = 1.78) also differed significantly from “touch”, p < .001, but
did not differ from “search”, again with p = 1.000. The ratings for “see” (M = 3.92, SD = 2.26)
differed significantly from those for “touch”, p < .001, but did not differ significantly from
“search”, p = .094.
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tion. But what is clear is that “perceive” does not allow for substitution within its
complement; of all five of the verbs, “perceive” was rated as the most opaque—it
was even more opaque than “look for”, although it did not differ from it in a way
that was statistically significant. This provides initial data that direct-object per-
ceptual locutions are not fully transparent within their complements: what we
see, sense, and perceive is individuated in a way that is finer-grained than mere
extension. Thus, there is evidence that perceptual verbs, this time including
“see”, exhibit one more property characteristic of verbs that report representa-
tional states: the objects of perception are individuated more finely than mere
extension.
One possibile explanation for this behavior is that seeing, sensing, and per-
ceiving may, to varying degree, have a reading that requires recognition. “Recog-
nize” is highly opaque within its complement. If I recognize Superman, it does
not follow that I have recognized Clark Kent. If perceptual verbs require or entail
recognition, then this would explain their opacity.33
5.2. Experiment 7
The seventh study broadened the scope of the sixth by testing seven perceptual
verbs—“see”, “hear”, “smell”, “touch”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation
of”—for Opacity. Unlike in Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 6, but like Experiments
3 and 5, this study provided participants with a brief description of the goals
of the study, along with examples of paradigmatic intensional and extensional
verbs, and how they behave with respect to the questions participants were asked
to answer. Like in Experiments 3 and 5, these additions were made with the
intention of forestalling misunderstandings of the task, solidifying participants’
grasp of the categories of intensional and extensional verbs, and providing them
with clear paradigm cases of verbs in each category.
33However, even if perceptual verbs have a reading that requires recognition, they also have
one that does not. This makes it perfectly felicitous to say things such as “I saw John’s new
invention, but had no idea what I was looking at”. The higher scores for Opacity simply make
it plausible that there is such a recognition-requiring reading.
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5.2.1. Methods
In the study, 213 participants filled out a brief questionnaire.34 Each participant
was asked nine questions, in random order. The questions differed only in that
they each involved a different one of the following nine verbs: “see”, “hear”,
“smell”, “touch”, “feel”, “perceive”, and “have a sensation of”, “search for”, or
“kick”, where “kick” is paradigmatically extensional, “search for” is paradigmat-
ically intensional, and the remainder of the verbs are perceptual verbs. To make
sure that the results did not depend on the particular phrasing of the questions,
participants were then assigned randomly to one of four vignettes: Spy, Butler, or
Novelist.
To test for Opacity, participants in the Spy vignette were given the following
instructions:
This study concerns the meanings of certain verbs in English.
Sometimes, when a verb is used in a sentence, it makes the truth
of that sentence sensitive to how objects are described. For exam-
ple, even though George W. Bush is the 43rd president of the United
States, Janet may admire the 43rd President of the United States with-
out admiring George W. Bush, because she doesn’t know that George
W. Bush is the 43rd President of the United States.
However, she cannot kick the 43rd president of the United States with-
out also kicking George W. Bush. In this case, it doesn’t matter
whether she knows that he is the 43rd president.
Keeping these examples in mind, please answer the following ques-
tions:35
Suppose that Janet sees James, and James is the spy. Is it possible
that Janet doesn’t see the spy?
Suppose that Janet hears James, and James is the spy. Is it possible
that Janet doesn’t hear the spy?
34Participants were English speakers, 57.8% male, average age 34, with 64.7% having at least
a bachelor’s degree.
35After being presented with the instructions, participants were presented with the questions
all at once, but in a random order. The instructions and examples remained on the screen.
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Suppose that Janet smells James, and James is the spy. Is it possible
that Janet doesn’t smell the spy?
Suppose that Janet touches James, and James is the spy. Is it possi-
ble that Janet doesn’t touch the spy?
Suppose that Janet feels James, and James is the spy. Is it possible
that Janet doesn’t feel the spy?
Suppose that Janet perceives James, and James is the spy. Is it
possible that Janet doesn’t perceive the spy?
Suppose that Janet has a sensation of James, and James is the spy.
Is it possible that Janet doesn’t have a sensation of the spy?
Suppose that Janet searches for James, and James is the spy. Is it
possible that Janet doesn’t search for the spy?
Suppose that Janet kicks James, and James is the spy. Is it possible
that Janet doesn’t kick the spy?
The other vignettes differed only in that they had a different NPs in place of
“James” and “the spy”; the Butler vignette made use of “the murderer” and “the
butler”, while the Novelist vignette made use of “her history teacher” and “the
best American novelist”. Participants responded to the questions on a 7-point
Likert scale, with an answer of 1 indicating a response of “definitely not” and 7
indicating “definitely yes”.
5.2.2. Results
The average rating for each of the verbs across the four vignettes can be found in
Figure 7. Again, the results were complex. The results show that “see” does not
differ statistically from “hear”, “smell”, or “feel”, but differs statistically from
all of the rest of the verbs tested. By contrast, neither “perceive” nor “have a
sensation of” differed statistically from “search for”, or from each other, but they
differed significantly from all of the other verbs. Thus there again appear to be
two separate clusters of verbs, one including “see”, “hear”, “smell”, and “feel”,
and another including “perceive”, “have a sensation of”, and “search for”, that
differ from each other with respect to Opacity.36 However, even the verbs in the
36The results were analyzed using a 9 (verb: see vs. hear vs. smell vs. touch vs. feel vs.
perceive vs. have a sensation of vs. search for vs. kick) × 3 (vignette: spy vs. butler vs. novelist)
36 · Justin D’Ambrosio
Figure 7: Mean ratings by condition in Experiment 7. Error bars show 95% con-
fidence interval.
more extensional cluster had scores that were significantly higher than “kick”.
5.2.3. Discussion
These results are not completely consistent with the results of the previous Opac-
ity experiment, but align more closely with the results of the first five exper-
iments. In this experiment, “see” again behaved mostly extensionally, with a
mean (3.31) that was much closer to that of “kick” (2.81) than that of “search for”
(4.87). This contrasts with the results of Experiment 6, in which “see” behaved
intensionally. But as in the last experiment, “perceive” did not differ statisti-
cally from the search verb with respect to Opacity, nor did “have a sensation
mixed ANOVA. As expected, there was a significant effect of verb, F(8, 1680) = 52.93, p < .001,
but no significant effect of vignette, F(2, 210) = .646, p = .525, and no significant interaction,
F(16, 1680) = 1.52, p = .084. To explore the differences between the verbs, I compared the
verbs pairwise, correcting for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni’s adjustment. As expected,
the highest mean was for “search for” (M = 4.87, SD = 2.01) while the lowest was for kick
(M = 2.81, SD = 2.185). Ratings for “perceived” (M = 4.82, SD = 2.05) were significantly
higher than the ratings for “kick”, p < .001, but did not differ statistically from the ratings for
“search for” (p = 1.000) or “have a sensation of” (M = 4.51, SD = 2.05 p = .665). The ratings
for “see” (M = 3.31, SD = 2.33) were significantly higher than “kick” (p < .001) and “touch”
(M = 2.91, SD = 2.168)), p = .001, significantly lower than “searched for” (p < .001), but did
not differ statistically from “hear” (M = 3.48, SD = 2.215), p = 1.000, “smell” (M = 3.3, SD =
2.160), p = 1.000 or “feel” (M = 3.33, SD = 2.20), p = 1.000.
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of”. Thus the results of the experiments did not agree on whether “see” resists
substitution within its complement, but agreed that “perceive” does. However,
given that subjects were given more explicit instructions in Experiment 7, and the
methodology was somehwat more refined, I think it is reasonable to give some
extra weight to the result that “see” behaved mostly extensionally with respect
to Opacity.
6. Solving the Puzzle
The above results provide us with evidence of how a range of perceptual verbs
behave with respect to the three features of intensionality. Here I will focus
primarily on the conclusions that we can draw for “see” and “perceive”, and the
bearing that these conclusions have on the puzzle laid out above, although I will
discuss the other perceptual verbs briefly.
First, the seven experiments above give us a relatively clear picture of the
behavior of “see” with respect to the three features of intensionality. Focusing
on Nonexistence in particular, the data from Experiments 1-3 seem to show that
“see” behaves much more like paradigatically extensional verbs such as “touch”
and “kick” than like intensional verbs such as “search for”, or perceptual verbs
like “perceive”. This makes it reasonable to conclude that “see”, like verbs such
as “touch” and “kick”, does not exhibit Nonexistence, and so there is no reason
to posit an intensional, de dicto reading for sentences in which it figures.
However, one might challenge this conclusion on the grounds that “see” did
differ statistically from “touch” and “kick” in these experiments—it was sig-
nificantly more intensional. We could explain this difference, along with the
even larger differences between “see” and paradigmatically intensional verbs, by
positing degrees of Nonexistence. However, holding that there is no de dicto
reading is a more plausible, and simpler explanation for the patterning data in
the Nonexistence experiments. There is no theoretical framework available for
explaining degrees of intensionality; typically, intensional readings are explained
in terms of scope, which is not a graded notion. Further, the statistical differences
between “see” and “touch” can be explained by holding that there is reasonable
variation among speakers, while also maintaining the best overall summary of
speaker judgments is that “see” does not have an intensional reading.
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Alternatively, we might explain the differences between “see” and “touch” by
holding that “see” uniformly has an intensional reading, but that for pragmatic
reasons, the majority of speakers disprefer this reading to the extensional one. I
agree that this explanation is not conclusively ruled out by the data. However,
I maintain that a better explanation is to hold that “see” is extensional, but that
this judgment of extensionality tolerates statistically significant variation. There
are two reasons for this. First, given that the questions in the Nonexistence
studies were phrased modally, if an intensional reading for “see” were uniformly
available, it would yield the prediction that all, or at least most, speakers would
answer the question affirmatively. But the fact that the majority of speakers an-
swered the question negatively counts against the availability of such a reading.
It is possible that the speakers are hearing the modal as restricted, or that speak-
ers have settled on the extensional reading in advance. But while these inter-
pretations are possible, they seem significantly more complicated than the view
that there is some lexical variation among speakers. Further, these explanations
confront the problem that they provide no clear explanation of the differences be-
tween “see” and “perceive”. If either of these factors serves to hide the notional
reading of ascriptions involving “see”, why is the same not true of “perceive”?
The fact that the questions in each study are minimal, and differ only in their
verbs, gives us reason to think that differences in response are traceable to lexi-
cal semantic differences between the verbs, which in turn counts in favor of the
hypothesis of lexical variation.37
Thus, while I grant that this is not the only explanation, I conclude that best
explanation of the Nonexistence data yields a victory for the extensionalist:
there does not seem to be a reading of perceptual ascriptions involving “sees”
that is true when the direct-object of the ascription fails to exist. Accordingly,
the answer to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger, as originally formulated, appears
to be “no”: Macbeth cannot see a dagger.
The results of the Nonspecificity and Opacity studies confirm this view.
Overall, in six out of the seven experiments, “see” behaved much more like the
paradigmatically extensional verb than the paradigmatically intensional one. The
exception was in Experiment 6, in which “see” did not differ statistically from
37This argument is closely related to the argument, given in the next section, that the notional
readings of perceptual verbs are not due to pragmatic factors.
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“search for” with respect to Opacity. However, in that same experiment, the
mean for “see” was significantly lower than that for “perceive”, and in Experi-
ment 7, which also tested for Opacity but included more explicit instructions,
ratings for “see” were again much closer to paradigmatically extensional than
intensional. Insofar as the features of intensionality have a higher probability of
being present or absent jointly, the fact that “see” behaved more extensionally
in six out of seven studies provides us with extra evidence that “see” was exten-
sional with respect to each individual property, including Nonexistence. Thus
the results for Nonspecificity and Opacity reinforce our conclusion that “see”
does not exhibit Nonexistence. While again, the studies did show that there is
sufficient variation among speakers to yield statistical differences, the best over-
all explanation of the data is to hold that “see” is extensional, and does not have
an intensional reading.
However, this victory for the extensionalist is not decisive, because the results
above also appear to show that that “perceive” patterns with the paradigmati-
cally intensional verb in terms of all three features of intensionality. In Experi-
ments 4, 6, and 7, “perceive” did not differ statistically from “search for”, while
in the remainder of the experiments, “perceive” was the second most intensional
verb tested, and always fell on the intensional side of the spectrum. Insofar as
these features of the behavior of “search for” are explained by the presence of a
de dicto reading, this conclusion gives us very strong evidence that, like “search
for”, “perceives” has a de dicto reading. Further, insofar as the three features of
intensionality tend to be present together, and have a higher probability of occur-
ring together, the fact that “perceive” was consistently more intensional across
the seven studies gives us additional evidence that “perceives” exhibits each in-
dividual property. In other words, the seven studies are mutually reinforcing. If
this is correct, we can extend these results to Macbeth’s case and conclude that
while Macbeth cannot see a dagger, he can perceive one.
In addition to these results, there is a further key result that warrants expla-
nation. Not only do the results above show that “see” patterns with paradigmat-
ically extensional verbs, while “perceives” patterns with paradigmatically inten-
sional verbs. Rather, they also reveal that there is a sharp contrast between “see”
and “perceive”. The ratings for “see” were significantly lower than those for
“perceive” in all seven experiments, and in most cases, the mean rating for “per-
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ceive” was much higher than that for “see”. This is a striking fact: “see” appears
to fall nearly on the opposite side of the intensional spectrum from “perceive”.
At first these results may seem paradoxical, since seeing is a form of perceiving—
it is just to visually perceive. How, then, is it possible for “perceive” to exhibit
Nonexistence while “see” fails to exhibit it? This tension is merely apparent. It
is true that to see is just to visually perceive—seeing is the visual form of rela-
tional or de re perceiving. The differences between “see” and “perceive” are most
plausibly explained by the presence of an additional, notional reading of “per-
ceive” that “see” altogether lacks.38 Thus, the presence of a de dicto reading of
reports involving “perceives”—a reading that is not present in reports involving
“see”—accounts for all of the results above. It accounts for why “see” patterns
with “touch”, why “perceive” patterns with “search for”, and why “perceive”
and “seek” contrast with one another.
Moreover, there are important syntactic differences between “see” and “per-
ceive” that give us reason to expect these semantic differences. It has often been
noted that perceptual verbs such as “see” and “hear” take small clauses as com-
plements. For example, both (21) and (22) are syntactically well-formed:
(21) John saw Bill fall.
(22) John heard Mary sing.
These constructions are often taken to provide evidence that perceptual verbs are
fully extensional, and express relations to situations [Barwise, 1981, Barwise and
Perry, 1999]. But “perceives” does not accept small clauses, as we can see from
(23) and (24):
(23) ?John perceived Bill fall.
38One might object as follows: what accounts for the difference between “sees” and “per-
ceives” is that “perceives” has a cognitive or epistemic use which is not existence entailing.
For instance, one can perceive that John was in distress, or perceive the wisdom in someone’s
statement. However, “see” likewise has cognitive and epistemic uses: one can see that John is in
distress, and see the wisdom in someone’s statement. Thus there is no difference available. But
further, when these verbs are used transitively, it is the perceptual reading that is dominant—it
is extremely difficult to hear “John perceives a unicorn” as cognitive or epistemic, unless by
“cognitive” or “epistemic” one simply means “has a reading that is not existence-entailing.”
Cognitive and epistemic readings are much more salient when the verbs take “that”-clauses as
complements.
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(24) ?John perceived Mary sing.
Rather, the only way to make (24) and (23) acceptable is to inflect the verb, giving
it aspect:
(25) John perceived Bill falling.
(26) John perceived Mary singing.
Thus there are some important selectional differences between the types of com-
plements that “see” and “perceive” can accept. This is the first indication that
they may also behave differently semantically.
Finally, there are important asymmetries between “perceive” and “see” that
are easily explained once we recognize that “perceive” has an intensional reading
while “see” does not. Consider a sentence such as (27):
(27) What I perceived was a ghost, but what I saw was actually just a sheet on
the clothesline.
This seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to say. But if we reverse the order of
the verbs, it sounds much worse:
(28) What I saw was a ghost, but what I perceived was a actually just a sheet
on the clothesline.
Why does (28) sound worse than (27)? The approach proposed here offers a
straighforward explanation. If “see” has no intensional reading, the first clause
in (28) is predicted to be anomalous, while the second clause in (27) is predicted
to be perfectly acceptable. Thus, the presence of an intensional reading for “per-
ceive” and the absence of such a reading for “see” explains the acceptability of
(27) and the anomalousness of (28).
Finally, the results of Experiments 3, 5, and 7 us some indication of how
verbs other than “see”, “perceive”, and “sense” behave with respect to the three
features of intensionality. With respect to Nonexistence, Experiment 3 showed
that “hear”, “smell”, and “feel” are approximately extensional: they did not
differ statistically from “see”. Much the same was true for the Opacity results:
“see” did not differ statistically from “hear”, “smell”, or “feel”. The means for
all of these verbs differed statistically from, but were still close to, those for
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“touch” and “kick”. However, in the Nonspecificity study, “hear” and “smell”
behaved quite differently: they did not differ statistically from “perceive” or
“have a sensation of”, and their means were much closer to that of “search for”
than “kick” or “touch”. Thus “hear” and “smell” appear to allow for nonspecific
readings, but are still existence-entailing and transparent. This is an interesting
finding, but not one that I will attempt to explain here.
7. Semantics or Pragmatics?
Historically, one of the major sources of disagreement in the debate over Mac-
beth’s dagger has concerned whether the purported intensional readings of per-
ceptual ascriptions have their source in the semantics or the pragmatics of per-
ceptual verbs. The extensionalist often attributes the purported intensional be-
haviors to pragmatic factors, while the intensionalist holds that such features are
semantic, and are due to the truth-conditions of perceptual ascriptions.
Extensionalists often argue that when a speaker seems to think that a per-
ceptual verb exhibits Nonexistence, the proposition to which the speaker is
assenting, or which the speaker is conveying, is not the proposition expressed
by the perceptual ascription itself. Rather, the speaker has latched onto a nearby
proposition that is free of existential commitments. A natural candidate for such
a proposition is the one expressed by a perceptual ascription prefixed by “seems
to”, or a similar operator which relieves the proposition of its ordinary existen-
tial commitments. For example, when speakers assent to the claim that John can
perceive an extraterrestrial even though there are no extraterrestrials, as they did
in Experiment 1, what they are really assenting to is the proposition that John
seems to perceive an extra terrestrial. Evidence that seems to point in favor of
perceptual ascriptions having intensional readings can then be reinterpreted as
evidence that fully extensional perceptual ascriptions convey propositions that
are true, but do not express them. As a result, the debate over the intensionality
of our perceptual vocabulary is intertwined with more general disputes over the
boundary between semantics and pragmatics.39
39There are a number of pragmatic views of how such propositions might be conveyed.
One might, for instance, treat them as expressed via loose talk, or pragmatic halos, or via
conversational implicatures.
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Since participants in the studies largely indicated that “see” is fully exten-
sional, the question concerning the locus of intensional behaviors does not arise
for “see”. However, these question can be raised for “perceive”. Given that “per-
ceive” seems to have a reading that is intensional, what guarantee do we have
that ascriptions involving “perceives” do not merely convey existence-neutral
propositions, rather than expressing them semantically? Participants in the stud-
ies may be responding in ways that reflect systematic pragmatic effects, rather
than ways that reflect the semantic content of perceptual ascriptions. However,
there is a decisive response to this objection. If the results obtained for “perceive”
were a consequence of pragmatics, rather than semantics, there would be no rea-
son that we would not observe the same phenomenon for “see” as well. Surely, if
John can seem to perceive something, he can seem to see it. But there was a large
contrast between “see” and “perceive” with respect to Nonexistence; this con-
trast is inexplicable if we think that that speakers are assenting to propositions
that are merely conveyed pragmatically rather than expressed semantically.
Further, given that the ratings for “perceive” were much closer to those of
the paradigmatically intensional verb in all seven of the experiments, if we think
that speakers are assenting to a proposition that is merely conveyed by percep-
tual ascriptions involving “perceives”, then there is no reason that we should
not say the same for the paradigmatically intensional verb “search”. Very few
semanticists would accept that the intuitions we have concerning paradigmat-
ically intensional verbs such as “seek”, “want”, “need”, “hope”, etc. are to be
accounted for pragmatically. But given that “perceive” exhibits similar behavior
to these verbs across the board, the extensionalist has no grounds to claim that
it is in fact fully extensional, unless she also wishes to hold that all intensional
transitive verbs are actually fully extensional. That is to say: “perceive” has an
intensional reading if anything does.
These considerations do not totally rule out the possibility that the effects
observed are pragmatic; it may be that certain semantic facts interact with prag-
matic facts in ways that could explain the contrasts between “see” and “perceive”.
One possible explanation of this kind is that “perceive” is more apt for report-
ing hallucinations and anomalous perceptions because it is a less common word.
On this alternative explanation, the difference in frequency of use between “see”
and “perceive” explains the differences they exhibit with respect to the three
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properties.40 However, this explanation does not generalize to the intensional
features of ordinary intensional transitive verbs. If the explanation of the pres-
ence of intensional readings in “perceive” is a matter of relative frequency of use,
then why do apparently high-frequency verbs such as “want” also exhibit these
features? Providing an explanation in terms of an extra, de dicto reading in the
case of “want” and an explanation in terms of frequency in the case of “perceive”
seems like an ad hoc attempt to explain away unwanted intensional behaviors.
8. Explaining the Recalcitrance
The fact that “see” appears to be extensional while “perceive” is intensional pro-
vides a simple explanation for why the debate over Macbeth’s dagger has been
so difficult to resolve in spite of its empirical character. For the most part, the
literature on Macbeth’s dagger has treated the category of perceptual verbs as
monolithic, and has failed to make distinctions between verbs that, as we have
seen, behave very differently. Given that authors often fail to draw this distinc-
tion, the intensionalist’s insistence that “see” exhibits intensional behaviors can
be explained by thinking that they really hear the intensional reading that is gen-
uinely available for “perceive”. Conversely, the extensionalist’s insistence that
perceptual verbs do not exhibit intensional features may be due to their tendency
to articulate the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger with “see”, which is extensional, as
opposed to “perceive”, which is not.
Of course, some intensionalists may resist this explanation, and claim that
people often do assent to uses of “sees” such as the following:
(29) John sees shapes and colors.
(30) John saw a bright flash of light.
(31) John sees a red square in his field of vision.
Further, they may hold that this is not the result of a tacit slide from reports in-
volving “perceives” to ones involving “sees”. I do not deny that such utterances
are sometimes acceptable—I think that “see” is flexible enough to figure into sen-
40This alternative explanation was suggested to me independently by Zoltán Gendler Szabó
and an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis. Thanks to both of them for raising this possibility.
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tences of this kind, and that we need an explanation of why such sentences are
not anomalous. One alternative explanation is that philosophers who hold that
“see” has an intensional reading may genuinely be among the very few for whom
this reading is available. There is clearly variation within speakers of English as
to whether perceptual verbs have intensional readings, and it is perfectly possi-
ble that some speakers hear verbs as having intensional readings while others do
not. While the number of speakers who hear “see” as exhibiting Nonexistence
is very small, it is possible that the participants indicating that they hear such a
reading are not just making a mistake.
But there are still other possibilities. It may be that “see” has a “core mean-
ing” that is extensional, and that there are certain kinds of fringe cases, such
as those above, in which characterizing the subject as “seeing” stars, or colored
patches, is acceptable. This could be thought of as a form of linguistic coercion,
in which the semantic features of “see” are tweaked to allow it to figure into
true reports even though its direct-object does not exist, or alternatively, perhaps
there is simply an extended, non-standard usage of the word.
Alternatively, it may be that “see” and other perceptual verbs exhibit what
some call an “open texture”. On the one hand, one aspect of our use of “see”
seem to be that it requires the existence of the thing seen. But on the other hand,
another aspect of our usage seems to require only that we are having a visual ex-
perience with a distinctive phenomenal character. Hallucinations are unexpected
cases in which only the latter requirement is satisfied, and so hallucinations bring
out a tension in the parameters implicit in our usage of perceptual language. If
such a picture is true, the experiments here indicate that for some verbs, the
dominant strand or dimension of usage is the one that requires a relation to a
piece of the environment, while for others, the dominant strand or dimension
is an experience’s phenomenal character. The connection between open-texture,
multi-dimensionality, and perceptual language warrants further exploration, but
such exploration extends well beyond the scope of this paper.
9. Conclusion
The above results serve as an important step in settling the debate over Macbeth’s
dagger. Insofar as the puzzle concerns whether Macbeth, in having his fatal
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vision, sees a dagger, the results count in favor of the extensionalist view: they
indicate that Macbeth does not see a dagger. However, the results also indicate
that the intensionalist view may be correct concerning a nearby perceptual verb:
“perceive”. This provides a partial vindication of both sides in the dispute, and
a plausible explanation of why the debate has proved so intractable.
Further, the above results also serve as a first step in providing a typology of
our perceptual vocabulary in terms of the features of intensionality. The results
show that there is at least one major division within the category of perceptual
verbs, and that “see” and “perceive” fall on opposite sides of this division. Fur-
ther, “hear”, “smell”, and “feel” pattern with “see” in terms of Nonexistence
and Opacity, but with “perceive” in terms of Nonspecificity. Thus, empiri-
cal semantic investigation reveals important semantic distinctions between per-
ceptual verbs, which have until now been seen as semantically uniform. These
results may also indicate the need for a more general theoretical framework to
capture the fact that perceptual verbs exhibit the features of intensionality selec-
tively.
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Appendix A: Histograms
Below are the histograms for each verb in Experiments 1, 4, and 6, fifteen in to-
tal. Each histogram graphically illustrates the frequency with which each verb
received a particular response: for each rating on the Likert scale, 1-7, the his-
togram shows how many participants chose that score when asked if a particular
verb exhibited a particular feature. In all of the studies, higher scores indicate
more intensionality. Thus, the further to the right the scores are distributed, the
more intensional the verb was with respect to that feature. Each column corre-
sponds to one of the studies, while each row corresponds to one of the verbs.
Column (a) gives the histograms for each verb in the Nonexistence study, col-
umn (b) the histograms for Nonspecificity, and column (c) presents Opacity.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8: Histograms for “touch”: (a) Nonexistence, (b) Nonspecificity, and (c)
Opacity
.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: Histograms for “see”: (a) Nonexistence, (b) Nonspecificity, and (c)
Opacity .
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 10: Histograms for “perceive”: (a) Nonexistence, (b) Nonspecificity, and
(c) Opacity .
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11: Histograms for “sense”: (a) Nonexistence, (b) Nonspecificity, and (c)
Opacity .
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 12: Histograms for “search for” in (a) Nonexistence, and “look for” in (b)
Nonspecificity, and (c) Opacity
.
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